With the European continental powers jointly setting traps for the Russians, the Continental Alliance fell into internal strife, and the Oceanic Alliance finally gained a brief breathing space. Japan was the first to benefit. Unlike the smooth course it enjoyed in the original timeline, this Russo-Japanese War had been full of twists and turns. Especially after the defeat in the Battle of the Strait of Malacca, the Spanish Navy came looking for trouble every few days, pushing the Japanese Empire to the brink of collapse. Sea lanes were no longer secure. Transport convoys were frequently attacked, logistics supplies became insufficient, and the Japanese forces at the front inevitably suffered as a result. If not for the sheer determination and fervor of the officers and soldiers holding things together, the battle line would probably have collapsed long ago. Even so, the front was forced to retreat all the way from Vladivostok to the banks of the Yalu River. The shadow of defeat hung over the Japanese people, despair continued to spread, and the Japanese government had even begun preparing an exit strategy. At this critical moment, the Spanish Navy that had been active in the Sea of Japan and constantly stirring up trouble suddenly disappeared. Soon after, news of chaos erupting across Europe arrived, and the Japanese government’s heart, which had sunk to rock bottom, began to stir again. After receiving news that the Trans-Siberian Railway had been cut, the Japanese felt that they had a chance once more. With European countries jointly undermining Russia, it was simply a once in a thousand years opportunity. … “Do not be blindly optimistic. The situation has not undergone any fundamental change. From a global perspective, the Oceanic Alliance is still at a disadvantage. The internal strife within the Continental Alliance is not particularly intense. With the Holy Roman government pressing down from above, the various countries will at most resort to underhanded moves in secret. The current mutual targeting among the powers, aside from long-standing accumulated contradictions, is primarily about the distribution of spoils. However, the prerequisite for sharing spoils is winning the war. On the question of winning the war, the European powers are united in their position. Most importantly, in the present disputes, the Holy Roman Empire has not directly participated. If the conflicts were truly to escalate further, the Holy Roman government would certainly step in to mediate. At present, our most urgent task is not to defeat the Russians, nor to open up colonies, but to find a way to survive. We cannot place all our hopes on the British. We must consider the new international situation we will face after the defeat of the Oceanic Alliance.” A bucket of cold water was poured over them, extinguishing the military’s blind optimism. Itō Hirobumi felt nothing but exhaustion. It was true that the situation on the Far Eastern battlefield had reversed, but the degree of human manipulation behind this reversal was far too obvious. The disruption of the Trans-Siberian Railway had created serious logistical problems for the Russian army, yet Japanese logistics were hardly in any better shape. If the enemy’s navy had not deliberately held back, the Japanese government would have struggled even to deliver strategic materials to the front lines, let alone pursue anything more ambitious. Defeating Russia, annexing the Far East, and then scheming to dominate all of East Asia. Itō Hirobumi did not even dare to think about such a strategic plan. Only if the Oceanic Alliance were to win the war would Japan, as one of the victors, perhaps gain the opportunity to move a few steps forward. If the Oceanic Alliance were defeated, then as one of the losers Japan would be fortunate just to preserve its homeland. Colonies would be entirely out of the question. Yamagata Aritomo said, “Itō-kun, are you not being too pessimistic? Britain’s performance in this war has indeed been disappointing, but it has not yet reached the point of imminent defeat. I have studied the history of European wars. Conflicts on this scale have often lasted ten years, several decades, or even more than a century. By contrast, the previous anti-French war ending in less than two years was the true anomaly. Given the foundations of the British Empire, however strained they may be, holding out against the Holy Roman Empire for three to five years should not be a problem. By the time they decide the outcome, we will already have secured our footing in the Far East. If the costs outweigh the gains, the Austrians will not undertake a long and exhausting expedition.” There was nothing wrong with that assessment. Historically, confrontations between European alliances had usually lasted a long time. The main reason lay in the limits of productivity. National strength was finite, and no country could sustain continuous large-scale warfare for extended periods. Typically, fighting would drag on until both sides were exhausted, at which point they would suspend hostilities, return home, and resume fighting after some time. After entering the nineteenth century, however, circumstances had changed. The earlier anti-French war was a classic example. Both sides were capable of supporting millions of troops in full-time combat. Direct confrontation was sufficient, and there was no need for so many drawn-out skirmishes. The times were different. Past historical experience could serve as a reference, but becoming obsessed with it would inevitably lead one astray. These issues were not beyond the military’s understanding. The real problem was that interests clouded judgment. Once immersed in them, decision-makers inevitably lose clarity. Having to cope with dramatic changes in the international situation while simultaneously restraining inappropriate ambitions within the domestic military, it was impossible not to feel exhausted. … Compared with Japan’s radical stance, the other members of the Oceanic Alliance were far more rational. Europe was indeed in turmoil, but the chaos remained within controllable limits. The only situation that had truly spun out of control was that of the Russian Empire. It was obvious that, with victory in the war seemingly within reach, the various powers had decided in advance to kick the Russians out of the game, thereby eliminating one competitor for the spoils. Moreover, it was not only the Continental Alliance whose rear was on fire. The Oceanic Alliance was facing serious internal problems of its own. Britain was being hit simultaneously by a wave of strikes and antiwar sentiment, as well as by the Irish independence movement. The British Empire likewise needed time to put out these fires and was in no position to launch a full-scale counteroffensive in the short term. The United States was in even greater turmoil. Not only did an antiwar movement erupt, but some states even unilaterally announced their withdrawal from the war. Joining when they wished and leaving when they pleased, like children who had not yet grown up, acting purely on impulse. Mexico and Colombia, both heavily affected by the war, reacted even more violently. On July 24, 1905, a coup broke out in Bogota. The original republican government collapsed, and the new government immediately began active diplomatic efforts in an attempt to withdraw from the war. Whether it could withdraw unscathed was uncertain, but at the very least the Holy Roman government showed considerable courtesy to the first country to leave the Oceanic Alliance. A ceasefire had already been implemented on the front lines, pending the outcome of negotiations. Mexico, since the fall of the Maximilian regime, had been mired in conflicts between warlords. The central government existed in name only. Such a country clearly lacked the capacity to wage an external war. The Mexican republican government’s survival up to this point owed much to the strong support of Britain and the United States. Without international intervention, a restoration of Maximilian, backed by the Holy Roman government, would have succeeded long ago. Mexico’s participation in this war was entirely the result of pressure from its patrons. Coupled with the fact that the United States did dispatch reinforcements, Mexico finally mustered the courage to gamble everything on a single throw. And then the tragedy began. The elite United States troops, in whom so much hope had been placed, staged an astonishing display of throwing their lives away almost as soon as they reached the battlefield. Although the Mexican army was also a rabble, years of civil war had not significantly improved their combat effectiveness, but it had greatly enhanced their ability to survive on the battlefield. Thus a bizarre scene emerged. Both sides suffered defeat, yet Mexican casualties amounted to less than one third of those of the United States forces. This was despite the fact that the Mexican troops committed to the battle were twice the number of the American troops. The blinding casualty figures led the Mexican warlords to draw a single conclusion. The elite troops of the United States were inferior to their own. Once this conclusion took hold, confidence in the Oceanic Alliance winning the war collapsed almost entirely. At the very least, there was no longer any hope on the Central American front. For the sake of their own interests, each faction began preparing an exit strategy. Some figures who had always leaned toward monarchy even openly raised the banner of Maximilian. South America was no calmer. The so-called “Big Three of South America,” Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, all witnessed massive antiwar demonstrations. The pro-British factions were strong, but the pro-Austrian factions were hardly weak. When Britain still enjoyed naval supremacy, everyone was happy to follow along and reap some benefits. Now that the situation had reversed, it was only natural for attitudes to change. What had once been frustration over the lack of breakthroughs on the battlefield had turned into sheer relief. No breakthrough meant no major substantive damage inflicted. The lower the damage, the lower the accumulated hostility. Naturally, the price required to smooth things over would also be lower. With a sufficiently thick skin, responsibility could even be pushed onto the British, claiming that one had been dragged into the war against one’s true intentions. Submit a token of allegiance, sacrifice a few scapegoats, pay some compensation, and the matter could be settled just like that. Such cases had long been common in European history. The countries of the Americas, having developed from European roots, were naturally influenced in the same way. For many countries in the Oceanic Alliance, the internal turmoil of the Continental Alliance was precisely the best opportunity to jump ship. Miss this window, and withdrawing unscathed later would require paying a far higher price. A glance at the frenetic pace of the Holy Roman Empire’s foreign ministry was enough to tell that something major was about to happen. … As if provoked, the Minister of War, von Fessler, declared, “Launching a landing operation now is impossible. Britain still retains substantial strength. Without first destroying the enemy’s air force and navy, the risks of a landing are simply too great.” The “Operation Sea Lion” was never going to be easy to implement. In the original timeline, the Third Reich had failed at it. Now, although the Holy Roman Empire was in a better position, the core strength of Britain’s navy and air force remained intact. If the landing were only halfway complete and the enemy suddenly launched a desperate all-out counterattack, the consequences would be catastrophic. Any great nation, when faced with a matter of life and death, is capable of unleashing incomparable strength. The British Empire that once dominated the world was not the sickly old cow of later generations. In a moment of crisis, it certainly did not lack the spirit to fight to the bitter end. Foreign Minister Leo said, “Your Excellency, please remain calm. A landing operation does carry enormous risks, but the potential gains are equally enormous. There is no need to directly occupy the British Isles. As long as we complete a landing, that is enough. Even if the landing site is somewhat remote, it does not matter. The coastline of the British Isles is extremely long. There will always be areas the enemy cannot fully cover. As long as we move fast enough, sending a small force to seize a foothold is not impossible. The Foreign Ministry is currently working to sway members of the Oceanic Alliance. Some have already been tempted, but they still cling to a final shred of hope in the British. If we can cut off that last bit of hope, the Oceanic Alliance will quickly collapse. Together with other countries we have secretly drawn in, it will be enough to stir up an anti-British tide across the world. At that point, we may not even need to launch a direct attack. The British may be forced to surrender under pressure from both internal unrest and external isolation. Even if there are risks, compared with the immense benefits, this gamble is worth taking. At worst, we can send our allies’ troops first. It is time for them to make their contribution.” There was nothing wrong with that logic. Allies exist to be used. By this stage of the hegemonic war, the only one truly being exploited was Russia, a fact so absurd that few would believe it. Now that risk-taking was required, letting the allies go first was only natural. Without sacrifice, what right did they have to share in the spoils of victory? After all, this war had largely been fought by the Holy Roman Empire. Everyone else had merely tagged along on the sidelines. Minister of War von Fessler fell into deep thought. Politics and the military were not the same thing. Operation Sea Lion had been drafted by the military and was clearly focused on purely military considerations. From a military standpoint, defeating the British Empire required nothing more than occupying London. The remaining rural areas were of little importance. Politically, however, the situation was completely different. Regardless of where the coalition forces landed, and regardless of whether follow-up operations could keep pace, as long as a foothold was established on the British Isles, it would count as a successful landing. The Foreign Ministry could then use this result openly to persuade hesitant governments, helping them make the correct decision. “It could be tried, but…”
[Previous | Table of Contents | Next]
Comments
Post a Comment